Testing Services
Industry
EU CRAFDA & MDRPayment & FinanceNewsAbout Us
EN繁中
Contact Us
← Back to news
Knowledge

SBOM Part 2 | How Far Does the CRA’s SBOM Requirement Actually Go?

September 2, 2026
SBOM Part 2 | How Far Does the CRA’s SBOM Requirement Actually Go?

An EN 18031 certificate is not quite the same as having an SBOM — they are different obligations under the Cyber Resilience Act

From the Cyber Resilience Act’s legal text and the prEN 40000 drafts to penalties and timelines — the SBOM obligation, broken down in one read.

You’ve settled “are we in scope?” — this article is about “what scope requires”

Earlier in this series we covered the four-step test: confirming whether your product falls within CRA scope. That is only the starting point — the real homework is the series of concrete obligations that follows: risk classification, conformity assessment and module selection, reporting obligations, and the subject of this article, the SBOM.

The SBOM deserves an article of its own because it is not a one-off checklist item. It is a continuous obligation that spans the product’s entire support period and keeps reappearing across several different provisions and draft standards. When manufacturers first hear “the CRA requires an SBOM”, the instinctive reaction is often “haven’t we already done something like that?” — and that is exactly where mistakes are easiest to make.

The CRA’s essential requirements come in two parts. Annex I, Part I is about whether the product itself is designed securely enough — encryption, access control, secure default configuration and so on. Part II is about whether, once the product is on the market, the manufacturer is capable of handling vulnerabilities on an ongoing basis. The SBOM is written into the second part. Its role is not “making the product more secure” but “providing the baseline data that vulnerability handling can be matched against” — without an SBOM, there is no way to determine whether a newly disclosed vulnerability affects your product.

So the SBOM is part of the CRA’s vulnerability-handling obligations — not something you finish once, but something to be maintained and updated with every revision throughout the product’s support period. It follows that a manufacturer holding EN 18031 / RED certification who believes they “already have an SBOM” is covered only for Annex I, Part I (the product-property cybersecurity requirements); that certification does not touch Annex I, Part II (the vulnerability-handling requirements).

Where exactly is the SBOM written into the CRA, in black and white?

The legal basis for the SBOM is Annex I, Part II (Vulnerability handling requirements), item (1) of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847. The provision (in close translation) reads:

“Identify and document vulnerabilities and components contained in products with digital elements, including by drawing up a software bill of materials in a commonly used and machine-readable format covering at the very least the top-level dependencies of the products.”

Besides being a continuous vulnerability-handling obligation, the SBOM also appears within the scope of the technical documentation (Article 31, Annex VII) — the technical documentation must include the product description, risk assessment, the basis for determining the support period, test reports and so on, and “where applicable” the SBOM as well; the technical documentation and the SBOM must be kept, under Article 13, for at least 10 years or the support period, whichever is longer.

CRA regulatory structure showing where the SBOM sits: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 branches to Annex I Part I product-property requirements, mapped to prEN 40000-1-2, and to Annex I Part II vulnerability-handling requirements, mapped to prEN 40000-1-3 (PRE-7), which is where the SBOM sits
CRA regulatory structure — where the SBOM sits

Two draft standards — what does each ask of the SBOM?

The CRA text itself states only the principle (“draw up a machine-readable SBOM covering at least the top-level dependencies”). How to actually do it depends on the draft harmonised standards still being written — the prEN 40000 series. The SBOM currently appears in two of the drafts, playing a different role in each:

prEN 40000-1-2 (Principles for cyber resilience) — the SBOM as part of “secure implementation”

prEN 40000-1-2 corresponds to CRA Annex I Part I (product-property requirements) and deals with general principles across the product-development lifecycle. The SBOM appears in two places:

  • 7.5.3 Secure implementation: requires that an SBOM “appropriate for the product be prepared and maintained”, as one of the secure-implementation activities;
  • 7.11.3 Third-party component cybersecurity management: requires that “third-party software components be included in the SBOM, in order to manage dependencies”.

This draft stays at the level of principle: the SBOM is a fixed step in the secure-development process, and third-party components must always be brought under management.

prEN 40000-1-3 (Vulnerability handling) — the SBOM’s itemised, detailed requirements

The document that truly spells the SBOM out — down to a level that can be audited clause by clause — is prEN 40000-1-3, which corresponds to CRA Annex I Part II. Its section 5.3.8, “[PRE-7] Identification of software components”, is devoted entirely to the SBOM.

The essentials come down to three things:

  • the format must be structured and machine-readable (for example SPDX or CycloneDX);
  • the content must cover at least the top-level dependencies, extending to transitive dependencies where technically feasible (this is an enhancement requirement, decided by the manufacturer based on product risk);
  • every new version or new build must have a corresponding SBOM regenerated for it.

A summary of PRE-7-RQ-01 through 07 and the enhancement requirements is provided in the appendix at the end of this article for readers who want to dig deeper.

A reminder: prEN 40000-1-3 is still at the Draft for Public Comment stage (as of our verification, voting had closed but progression to Formal Vote was not yet confirmed, and it has not been published in the Official Journal of the EU). Clause numbers and content may still change before final adoption, and the draft cannot serve as a final basis of compliance. But because the underlying legal obligation comes from Annex I Part II of the Regulation itself, changes to the draft do not affect the answer to “is an SBOM necessary?” — only the details of “what counts as doing it right”.

How the SBOM relates to penalties and the timeline

The SBOM is an obligation requiring continuous maintenance — so what happens if you fail it? Violations of the Annex I essential requirements (including the Part II SBOM requirement) and of the Article 13 and 14 obligations carry administrative fines of up to €15 million or 2.5% of worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher (Article 64) — the highest tier in the CRA’s penalty structure. The SBOM may sound like just a list, but in legal position it sits under the same penalty tier as product-property requirements like encryption and access control.

On the timeline, two dates deserve particular attention — and the gap between them is precisely where most manufacturers misjudge how much preparation time they have:

  • 11 September 2026: the Article 14 manufacturer reporting obligations begin to apply (an actively exploited vulnerability requires an early warning within 24 hours and a notification within 72 hours, with a final report within 14 days of a remediation measure being available; for severe incidents the final report is due within 1 month of the 72-hour notification). This obligation applies to every product that is already on the market and within CRA scope — not only to new products launched after 2027.
  • 11 December 2027: the CRA’s full application date, when Annex I (including the Part II SBOM requirement) formally becomes mandatory for in-scope products.

Here is the problem: meeting Article 14’s 24-hour / 72-hour reporting deadlines in practice depends on an SBOM to answer “is our product affected?” in time. In other words, although the SBOM formally takes effect as an Annex I requirement on 11 December 2027, the data needed to support the reporting obligation that takes effect on 11 September 2026 is exactly this SBOM. That is a gap of more than a year — wait until late 2027 to start preparing, and you will find the reporting obligation has already been live for over a year without the underlying data to support it.

SBOM and CRA key dates side by side: 11 September 2026 the Article 14 reporting obligations take effect, then a gap period, then 11 December 2027 the CRA becomes fully applicable including Annex I and the SBOM
SBOM and CRA: the key dates, side by side

Three common misconceptions, cleared up at once

Misconception 1: “We already have RED / EN 18031 certification, so the SBOM should be covered.” The EN 18031 trilogy (network protection, privacy protection, protection from fraud in financial transactions) corresponds to the RED’s security requirements, which are close in nature to CRA Annex I Part I (product-property requirements) — and contain nothing at all on software-component identification or SBOMs. The SBOM belongs to Annex I Part II (vulnerability-handling requirements). These are two different categories of obligation: your existing EN 18031 investment does not automatically cover the SBOM, which needs to be planned separately.

Misconception 2: “EN 40000 isn’t officially published yet, so we don’t need to prepare the SBOM yet.” Harmonised standards are only one route for demonstrating compliance (the presumption of conformity). The SBOM’s legal obligation comes directly from Annex I Part II of the Regulation itself, and whether the standard has been published in the Official Journal has no bearing on when the underlying legal obligation takes effect. More to the point, the Article 14 reporting obligations take effect on 11 September 2026 — in practice you need SBOM support well before the standards are finalised and well before full application at the end of 2027.

Misconception 3: “One SBOM covering top-level dependencies is enough.” The baseline requirement (PRE-7-RQ-03) indeed only demands top-level dependency coverage, but the draft already contains enhancement requirements calling for transitive dependencies to be covered where technically feasible — and a fresh SBOM should be generated for every new version and every new build. Whether an enhancement requirement applies is decided by the manufacturer based on its own product risk; it is not an automatic exemption. We recommend assessing this early rather than discovering at audit time that the baseline version is not enough.

For manufacturers preparing for the CRA: how to prioritise the SBOM right now

The fact that the draft standards are still moving does not mean the SBOM can be pushed down the list. A more pragmatic ordering is:

  • Now (draft stage): work directly from the logic of Annex I Part II of the CRA Regulation and prEN 40000-1-3 PRE-7 — inventory your software components and stand up an SBOM-generation process. There is no need to wait for the standard to be finalised.
  • Before 11 September 2026: ensure the SBOM can at least support answering “are we affected by this vulnerability?” within 24 hours, connecting it to the Article 14 reporting deadlines.
  • Before 11 December 2027: complete the SBOM as part of the technical documentation, and decide — based on the product risk assessment — whether enhancement requirements such as transitive-dependency coverage and component hashes are needed.
  • Ongoing: update the SBOM with every new version and build, and retain it together with the technical documentation for at least 10 years or the support period, whichever is longer.

If you have confirmed that your product falls within CRA scope but are still unsure how deep your SBOM needs to go or which format to target, or would like professional review of your overall CRA readiness, feel free to contact us — our consultants can help assess your specific case.

You are also welcome to join the in-person seminar in Taipei on Friday 18 September, where you can put questions directly to a CRA expert from Spain and learn more about planning for 2027 compliance and estimating the time and cost of implementation. Registration: Register for the seminar

Appendix

prEN 40000-1-3 PRE-7 — the SBOM requirements, clause by clause (Identification of software components)

ClauseWhat it requires (in plain language)
PRE-7-RQ-01All software components contained in the product shall be identified and documented.
PRE-7-RQ-02For each component, record at minimum: the software manufacturer, the component name, and the component version.
PRE-7-RQ-03An SBOM shall be drawn up covering at least the product’s top-level dependencies — this is the baseline threshold.
PRE-7-RQ-03-RE (enhancement)Where technically feasible, all software components (not just top-level) shall be included in the SBOM, so that transitive dependencies can be detected.
PRE-7-RQ-04The SBOM shall be produced in a structured, machine-readable format (e.g. SPDX, CycloneDX).
PRE-7-RQ-05When a software component has a new version or a new build, a new SBOM shall be created to reflect it.
PRE-7-RC-01 (recommendation)When new information about an existing component is discovered, or an SBOM error needs correcting, a revised SBOM should be published.
PRE-7-RQ-06SBOM metadata shall include: author, version, and timestamp.
PRE-7-RQ-07Beyond the basic information, each component shall include its dependency relationships and a unique identifier (e.g. CPE, PURL, SWHID).
PRE-7-RQ-07-RE (enhancement)Where the supplier provides component hash values and the corresponding algorithm, they shall be included in the SBOM.

Two practical details matter here. First, the two items marked “RE” (Requirement Enhancement) — transitive-dependency coverage and hash values — do not apply automatically. Under [APP-1-RQ-01], “the applicability of each enhancement requirement shall be determined according to product risk”: the manufacturer decides, based on its own product’s risk-assessment outcome, whether that depth is needed. Second, PRE-7 also surfaces upstream in the vulnerability-handling process — for example, [PRE-1-RQ-04] requires “a mapping of upstream dependencies, including open source, to support coordination and notification activities so that issues can be resolved in a timely manner” — which shows the SBOM is not a static document but the foundational data underpinning the whole vulnerability-response process.

One addition: the CRA text and the mandatory PRE-7 requirements are locked onto software components, but prEN 40000-1-3 notes that, where technically feasible, hardware components may also be included in the SBOM to make dependency tracing more complete. This is not a legal minimum — it is a value-added practice.

Frequently asked questions

Q: How deep does the CRA’s SBOM have to go? The regulation requires a commonly used, machine-readable format (such as SPDX or CycloneDX), covering at least the product’s top-level dependencies; transitive dependencies may be added where technically feasible (an enhancement requirement, decided by the manufacturer based on risk). A corresponding SBOM should be regenerated for every new version and every new build.

Q: We have EN 18031 certification — does that mean we already have an SBOM? No. EN 18031 corresponds to the product-property requirements (Annex I Part I), while the SBOM is part of the vulnerability-handling obligations (Part II) — two different parts of Annex I. The technical work behind an existing certification can carry over, but the CRA’s SBOM still needs to be established separately.

Q: How long must the CRA SBOM and technical documentation be kept? Under Article 13 and Annex VII, the technical documentation (including the SBOM where applicable) must be kept for at least 10 years, or the product’s support period, whichever is longer.

Glossary

  • CRA | Cyber Resilience Act — the EU regulation, i.e. Regulation (EU) 2024/2847.
  • Annex I, Part I / Part II | The two parts of the CRA’s essential cybersecurity requirements: Part I covers product-property requirements (e.g. encryption, access control); Part II covers vulnerability-handling requirements (including the SBOM) and is a continuous obligation across the support period.
  • SBOM | Software Bill of Materials — the inventory of software components that CRA Annex I Part II item (1) requires the manufacturer to draw up; its legal scope is locked onto software components (prEN 40000-1-3 additionally permits hardware components where technically feasible).
  • prEN 40000-1-2 | Draft CRA horizontal harmonised standard corresponding to Annex I Part I, setting product-lifecycle cybersecurity principles and activities (SBOM appears in clauses 7.5 and 7.11).
  • prEN 40000-1-3 | Draft CRA horizontal harmonised standard corresponding to Annex I Part II, setting itemised vulnerability-handling process requirements (detailed SBOM requirements in 5.3.8 [PRE-7]).
  • Requirement Enhancement (RE) | Clauses in the prEN 40000 series marked as “enhancement requirements”; whether they apply is decided by the manufacturer through its own product risk assessment — they are not uniformly mandatory.
  • Top-level dependency / Transitive dependency | A component the product references directly / the dependencies of dependencies, traced on down the chain.
  • Presumption of conformity | Conformity with published harmonised standards creates a presumption of conformity with the corresponding CRA Annex I requirements (Article 27). The EN 40000 series does not confer this effect before publication in the Official Journal.
  • Technical documentation | (Article 31, Annex VII) The SBOM is part of the technical documentation where applicable; it must be kept for at least 10 years or the support period, whichever is longer.
  • Support period | The period during which the manufacturer must keep handling product vulnerabilities under Annex I Part II; in principle at least 5 years.
  • Article 14 | The CRA provision on manufacturers’ vulnerability / severe-incident reporting obligations, applicable from 11 September 2026 (24-hour early warning / 72-hour notification / final report within 14 days or 1 month).
  • EN 18031 | The standards series for the RED (Radio Equipment Directive) security requirements; in nature it maps to CRA Annex I Part I and does not cover the SBOM or vulnerability-handling obligations.

References

The legal provisions and dates cited in this article are based on the following documents:

  • Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), full text in the EU’s official legal database EUR-Lex: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj — SBOM in Annex I, Part II, point (1); penalties in Article 64; technical documentation in Article 31 and Annex VII; reporting obligations in Article 14; application dates in Article 71.
  • prEN 40000-1-2 (Draft for Public Comment), clauses 7.5.3 Secure implementation and 7.11.3 Third-party component cybersecurity management.
  • prEN 40000-1-3 (Draft for Public Comment), clause 5.3.8 [PRE-7] Identification of software components, and the Requirement Enhancement list in clause 5.2.2.1.
  • ISO/IEC 5962:2021, the international standard for the SPDX specification; the CycloneDX specification, maintained by the OWASP community: https://cyclonedx.org/

By the Secure Vectors Surveillance Inc. (SV Surveillance) × Applus+ Laboratories consulting team

* This article is regulatory commentary, not legal advice. As of writing, the prEN 40000 series remains a Draft for Public Comment, has not been published in the Official Journal of the EU, and its clause numbers and content may change before formal publication. Final compliance determinations for specific cases remain subject to official EU documents and the interpretations of the competent authorities.

Keep Reading

More from the lab